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Abstract—We study oblivious transfer (OT) between Alice and
Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve over a degraded
wiretapped binary erasure channel from Alice to Bob and Eve.
In addition to the privacy goals of oblivious transfer between
Alice and Bob, we require privacy of Alice and Bob’s private data
from Eve. In previous work we derived the OT capacity (in the
honest-but-curious model) of the wiretapped binary independent
erasure channel where the erasure processes of Bob and Eve are
independent. Here we derive a lower bound on the OT capacity
in the same secrecy model when the wiretapped binary erasure
channel is degraded in favour of Bob.
I. INTRODUCTION
In secure multiparty computation, mutually distrusting users
want to collaborate in computing functions of their data. They
want to do this in such a way that no user derives additional
information about other users’ data than the function they
compute. This has applications in several areas including data-
mining, voting, auctions etc. [5]. In general, secure computa-
tion is not possible between users who only have access to
private/common randomness and noiseless communication [9].
For two-user secure computation, a noisy channel between
the users (in addition to a noise-free public channel) provides
a stochastic resource on which secure computation can be
based [6]. Oblivious transfer (OT), which is a specific two-
user secure computation, has been proposed as a primitive on
which all secure computation can be based [7], [8], and OT
itself can be obtained from noisy channels.
In 1-of-2 string OT, one of the users, say, Alice, has two bit-
strings of equal length. The other user, say, Bob, wants to learn
exactly one of the two strings. Bob does not want Alice to find
out which of the two strings he wants, while Alice wants to
ensure that Bob does not learn anything more than one of the
strings. The OT capacity of a discrete memoryless channel is
the largest rate of the string-length per channel use that can be
achieved. We assume that the users are honest-but-curious, that
is, they follow the protocol agreed upon but they may try to
gain illegitimate information about the other user’s private data
from everything they have learned at the end of the protocol.
For such users, Nascimento and Winter [13] obtained a lower
bound on the OT capacity of noisy channels and distributed
sources. Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] obtained lower bounds on
the honest-but-curious OT capacity for generalized erasure
channels. These lower bounds are tight when the erasure
probability is at least 12 . Pinto et. al. [14] showed that, for
erasure probability at least 12 , the OT capacity of generalized
erasure channels remains the same even when the users are
malicious, that is, even if a dishonest user arbitrarily deviates
from the protocol.
Presence of third parties is a natural concern when using
noisy channels. Motivated by this, OT over wiretapped binary
erasure channel was studied in [11]. Building on the ideas
from [2], [13], the OT capacity of this channel was charac-
terized there for the honest-but-curious model. Both 2-privacy,
where the eavesdropper may collude with either Alice or Bob,
and 1-privacy, where there are no collusions, were considered.
In [12], the problem of performing independent OTs between
Alice and each of the other parties over a binary erasure
broadcast channel was considered. Inner and outer bounds on
the OT capacity region were presented which meet except in
one regime of parameter ranges.
Here we study the OT capacity of the degraded wiretapped
binary erasure channel. The problem presents some interesting
new features. Oblivious transfer relies on the noise in the
legitimate channel (Alice-to-Bob channel) to hide information
of Alice and Bob from each other. In a degraded erasure
channel, the wiretapper obtains more information about the
noise process on the legitimate channel (compared to an inde-
pendent erasure channel where it receives no information on
this noise process from the channel). Our achievable scheme
is in fact more involved compared to the one in [11], [12]
precisely because of this fact. This is in contrast with secret
key agreement using broadcast channels with public discussion
where optimal schemes are simpler for the degraded channel in
the sense that no public discussion is needed to achieve secret
key capacity when the channel is degraded [1], [10]. While
we do not prove the optimality of our scheme, we believe that
the additional complexity is unavoidable.
In Section II, we present the formal problem definition.
The main result is presented in Section III, and the proof is
presented in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the setup of Fig. 1, Alice is connected to Bob and an
eavesdropper Eve over a broadcast channel pY Z|X . Addition-
ally, there is a public channel of unlimited capacity, over which
Alice and Bob can take turns to send messages. Each message
sent over this public channel is received by all users. Alice’s
private data is a pair of strings K0,K1 which are m-bit each,
while Bob’s private data is a choice bit U . K0,K1, U are
Alice Bob
Eve
pY Z|X
Public Channel
K0,K1 U
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Z
KˆU
Fig. 1: Setup for oblivious capacity over a broadcast channel
independent and uniform over their respective alphabets. The
goal is for Alice and Bob to do an OT using (K0,K1, U ),
without Eve learning anything about (K0,K1, U ).
We consider the degraded broadcast channel setup shown in
Fig. 2. This is a special case of Fig. 1. Here the broadcast chan-
nel pY Z|X is made up of a cascade of two independent binary
erasure channels (BECs), BEC(ǫ1) with erasure probability ǫ1
followed by a BEC(ǫ2). That is, X ∈ {0, 1}, Y, Z ∈ {0, 1, e},
and pY Z|X = pY |XpZ|Y with pY |X(e|1) = pY |X(e|0) =
ǫ1, pY |X(1|1) = pY |X(0|0) = 1 − ǫ1, and pZ|Y (e|e) =
1, pZ|Y (e|1) = pZ|Y (e|0) = ǫ2, pZ|Y (1|1) = pZ|Y (0|0) =
1− ǫ2.
Definition 1. Let n,m be positive integers. An (n,m)-protocol
is an exchange of messages over the setup of Figure 1. Alice
transmits a bit over the broadcast channel pY Z|X at each time
instant t = 1, 2, . . . , n. Alice’s private strings are m-bits each.
Before each channel use by Alice and also after Alice’s last
channel use, Alice and Bob can take turns to send an arbitrary
but finite number of messages over the public channel.
We denote by F the transcript of the public channel at the
end of the protocol.
Definition 2. The final view of a user is the set of random
variables it generates and receives over the execution of
the protocol. The final views of Alice, Bob and Eve are,
respectively,
VA := (K0,K1, X
n,F),
VB := (U, Y
n,F),
VE := (Z
n,F).
At the end of the protocol, Bob generates an estimate KˆU
of KU , as a function of its final view VB .
Definition 3. The rate rn of an (n,m)-protocol is
rn :=
m
n
(1)
Definition 4. A rate R is achievable in the setup of Figure 1
if there exists a sequence of (n,m)-protocols such that, as
n −→∞, rn −→ R and
P [KˆU 6= KU ] −→ 0, (2)
I(KU ;VB) −→ 0, (3)
I(U ;VA) −→ 0, (4)
I(K0,K1, U ;VE) −→ 0. (5)
Definition 5. The capacity C in the setup of Figure 1 is
C := sup{R : R is achievable} (6)
Alice
Bob Eve
BEC(ǫ1) BEC(ǫ2)
Public Channel
K0,K1
U
KˆU
X Y Z
Fig. 2: Setup for oblivious transfer over a degraded binary
erasure broadcast channel
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Our main result is a lower bound on C, for the setup of
Figure 2.
Theorem 1.
min
{
1
3
ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1
}
≤ C ≤ min{ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}.
Hence, when ǫ1 ≤ 13ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), we have C = ǫ1. Note
that the upper bound of ǫ2(1− ǫ1) in Theorem 1 follows from
the fact that OT capacity is upper bounded by the secret key
capacity of the wiretapped channel. This is because if Bob runs
the protocol with the choice bit set deterministically to, say,
0, then K0 is a secret key between Alice and Bob. The upper
bound follows from the fact that ǫ2(1 − ǫ1) is the secret key
capacity of this wiretapped channel with public discussion [1],
[10]. The upper bound of ǫ1 follows from fact that this is an
upper bound for two-party OT capacity of the binary erasure
channel with erasure probability ǫ1 [2].
Section IV gives a protocol that is used to prove the lower
bound part of Theorem 1.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will describe a protocol which will
be used to show that the lower bound in Theorem 1 is an
achievable rate. We begin by presenting the main ideas used
in this protocol, before presenting a formal description for it.
Let r be any rate smaller than min{ 13ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1}. In
the protocol, Alice begins by transmitting a sequence Xn
of independent bits, each equally likely to be 0 or 1. Bob
receives the corresponding erased version Y n, while Eve gets
Zn which is an erased version of Y n (see Figure 2). Let E
denote the set of indices at which Y n has erasures, and let E
be its complement. Out of the set E, Bob picks a good set G of
size |G| = nr uniformly at random. Similarly, Bob also picks
a bad set B of size |B| = nr uniformly at random out of set
E. Let G˜ := E \G denote the unerased indices which are not
in G. Note that, |G˜| is approximately n(1− ǫ1− r). Similarly,
B˜ := E \ B is the set of erased indices which are not in B,
and |B˜| is approximately n(ǫ1−r). If U = 0, Bob assigns sets
(L0, L1) = (G,B), otherwise Bob sets (L0, L1) = (B,G).
Bob first declares the sets G˜, B˜ over the public channel.
Thereafter, Bob forms sequential, disjoint subsets (G˜L, G˜S) of
the set G˜, where |G˜L| is about 2nrǫ2 and |G˜S | is about
nr(1−ǫ2)
ǫ2
.
Both G˜L and G˜S will be used to generate secret keys known
to both Alice and Bob, but hidden from Eve. Note that for
r < min{ 13ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1}, all these sets of the required sizes
can be formed.
Alice and Bob use the set of transmissions Xn|G˜L to agree
on a secret key SL, secret from Eve. The size of SL is 2nr
bits. Similarly, Alice and Bob use Xn|L0∪G˜S to form a secret
key S0 and Xn|L1∪G˜S to form a secret key S1. Here, |S0| =
|S1| = nr.
Bob now needs to reveal (L0, L1) to Alice, while hiding
both these sets from Eve, so as not to reveal U to Eve. Towards
this goal, Bob forms a set L which is an ordered version of
the set L0 ∪L1. Then, Bob forms a binary vector Q of length
2nr as follows. For all i = 0, 1, . . . , 2nr − 1, the ith element
of Q, denoted by Qi will indicate whether the ith element of
L, denoted by Li, belongs to L0 or L1. That is, Qi = 0 when
Li ∈ L0, otherwise Qi = 1. Bob now sends SL⊕Q to Alice,
which is sufficient for Alice to recover (L0, L1).
Alice finally sends the encrypted strings K0 ⊕ S0 and
K1 ⊕ S1 to Bob over the public channel. Since Bob knows
SU completely (since he knows Xn|LU∪G˜S ), Bob can recover
KU .
Before presenting the protocol more formally, we point
out a comparison with the independent erasure case of [11].
In the independent erasure channel, since Eve has no side
information about the erasure pattern of Bob, there is no
need for Bob to encrypt (L0, L1) before sending it over the
public channel. The additional burden of encrypting L0, L1
here requires Alice and Bob to generate a secret key SL which
is twice as long as each string K . Along with SU , effectively,
Alice and Bob agree on secret keys which are together thrice
as long as each string K . This explains the 13 factor in the rate
achieved.
Protocol 1. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Let ǫ˜2 = ǫ2(1 − δ). Let r =
min{ 13 ǫ˜2(1 − ǫ1) − θδ, ǫ1 − δ} be the rate to be achieved,
where θδ = δ(1 + 2ǫ˜2 ).
Alice Transmits a sequence Xn of independent bits,
equally likely to be 0 or 1, over the broadcast channel
in Figure 2.
Bob Receives the sequence Y n from the output of
BEC(ǫ1) and forms the erased and unerased sets of
indices of Y n as, respectively,
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = e}
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= e}
If |E| < n(1 − ǫ1 − δ) or |E| < n(ǫ1 − δ), Bob
declares an error and quits. Otherwise, Bob proceeds
and forms the following sets out of E and E:
G := Unif{A ⊂ E : |A| = n(r + δ)}
B := Unif {A ⊂ E : |A| = n(r + δ)}
G˜ := E\G
B˜ := E\B
where Unif{.} denotes a random, uniformly dis-
tributed, choice over the collection of sets. Note that
|G˜| ≥ n(1− ǫ1 − r − δ) and |B˜| ≥ n(ǫ1 − r − δ).
Bob reveals the sets G˜, B˜ over the public channel.
Bob now forms the sets L0, L1 as follows:
U = 0 : L0 = G, L1 = B
U = 1 : L0 = B, L1 = G
Let L be an ordered version of the set L0 ∪L1. Bob
forms a binary vector Q of 2nr bits, with elements
labelled Qi, i = 0, 1, . . . , 2nr − 1 defined as:
Qi =
{
0, Li ∈ L0
1, Li ∈ L1
Bob takes the first 2n(r+δ)ǫ˜2 indices in G˜ and calls it
set G˜L. Bob also takes the next nr(1−ǫ˜2)ǫ˜2 indices in
G˜ and calls it set G˜S . One can verify that |G˜L| +
|G˜S | ≤ |G˜|. Bob then forms a secret key SL using
Xn|G˜L , where SL is known to Alice but hidden from
Eve. Here, SL is 2n(r + δ) bits long. Finally, Bob
sends the following quantity to Alice over the public
channel:
SL ⊕Q
Alice Uses Xn|L0∪G˜S to form a secret key S0 and uses
Xn|L1∪G˜S to form a secret key S1. Both S0, S1 are
nr-bit each. Alice finally sends the following two
encrypted strings to Bob over the public channel:
K0 ⊕ S0
K1 ⊕ S1
Bob Knows Xn|LU∪G˜S and hence knows SU , thereby
recovering KU from Alice’s public message.
Lemma 1. A rate of min{ 13ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1} is achievable in
the setup of Figure 2.
A proof of this lemma is deferred to the Appendix. Below,
we give a sketch of this proof.
• (2) is satisfied for the following reason. Since Bob knows
both Xn|LU and Xn|G˜S , Bob knows X
n|LU∪G˜S . Hence,
Bob knows the secret key SU and so, Bob can recover
KU correctly from KU ⊕ SU that Alice sends on the
public channel.
• (3) is satisfied because Bob knows nothing about Xn|L
U
.
Since SU is a secret key generated from Xn|L
U
∪G˜S
and
has the same number of bits as Xn|L
U
, Bob will learn
practically no information about SU and, hence, about
KU .
• Alice can learn about U only from Bob’s public mes-
sages. In the scheme, Alice learns L0, L1 from Bob’s
public messages. Since L0, L1 are of the same size and
since the channel acts independently on each input bit,
Alice learns no information about U . Hence, (4).
• Finally, Eve cannot learn U since the identity of L0, L1
remains hidden from her by the secret key SL. Eve only
learns L0∪L1 and nothing more. Conditioned on knowing
U , Eve still does not learn (K0,K1) since these are
encrypted using secret keys S0, S1 which are secret from
Eve. Hence, (5) is satisfied.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In order to prove Lemma 1, we will use a se-
quence {Pn}n∈N of Protocol 1 and show that for r <
min
{
1
3ǫ2(1 − ǫ1), ǫ1
}
, (2) - (5) hold for {Pn}n∈N.
We note that for Pn, the transcript of the public channel is
F = (G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1). (7)
Let J be the indicator random variable for the event that
Bob declares an error and quits. Using Chernoff bound, we
see that P [J = 1] −→ 0 as n −→∞.
1) In order to show (2) holds, given that P [J = 1] −→ 0, it
suffices to show that P [KˆU 6= KU |J = 0] −→ 0.
When J = 0, Bob knows Xn|LU and Bob also knows
Xn|G˜S . Hence, Bob knows X
n|LU∪G˜S . As a result, Bob
knows the secret key SU derived out of Xn|LU∪G˜S .
Hence, Bob can get KU using KU ⊕ SU sent by Alice.
Thus, P [KˆU 6= KU |J = 0] = 0.
2) In order to show (3) holds, it will suffice to show that
I(KU ;VB |J = 0) −→ 0. All terms and assertions below
are conditioned on the event J = 0, but this is being
suppressed for ease of writing.
I(KU ;VB)
= I(KU ;U, Y
n,F)
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1)
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU ⊕ SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, Q,KU ⊕ SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
[since SL is a function of (Y n, G˜)]
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, G,B,KU ⊕ SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
[since (G,B) is a function of (U,Q, G˜, B˜) and Q is
a function of (U,G,B)]
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, G,B,KU ,KU ⊕ SU )
[since SU is a function of (Y n, G, G˜)]
= I(KU ;U, Y
n, G˜, B˜, G,B,KU ⊕ SU )
[since KU is independent of all other variables above]
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ SU |U, Y
n, G,B, G˜, B˜)
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ SU | U, Y
n, Y n|G˜SG,B, G˜, B˜)
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ SU | Y
n|G˜S )
[since SU − Y n|G˜S − U, Y
n, G,B, G˜, B˜ is a
Markov chain]
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ SU | Y
n|G˜S )
= I(KU ;KU ⊕ SU | X
n|G˜S )
= H(KU ⊕ SU | X
n|G˜S )−H(SU | KU , X
n|G˜S )
= H(KU ⊕ SU | X
n|G˜S )−H(SU | X
n|G˜S )
≤ |SU | −H(SU | X
n|G˜S )
As a consequence of Lemma 2 of Appendix B, the above
quantity is small.
3) In order to show (4) holds, it suffices to show that
I(U ;VA|J = 0) −→ 0. All terms and assertions below
are conditioned on the event J = 0, but this is being
suppressed for ease of writing.
I(U ;VA)
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n,F)
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1)
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,S0, S1)
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n, G˜, B˜, Q, S0, S1)
[since SL is a function of (Xn, G˜)]
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n, G˜, B˜, L0, L1, S0, S1)
[since (L0, L1) is a function of (G˜, B˜, Q) ]
= I(U ;K0,K1, X
n, G˜, B˜, L0, L1)
[since (S0, S1 is a function of (Xn, L0, L1, G˜))]
= I(U ;L0, L1)
[since U − L0, L1 −K0,K1, Xn, G˜, B˜ is a Markov chain]
= 0
[since the channel acts independently on each input bit
and since |L0| = |L1|]
4) In order to show (5) holds, it will suffice to show that
I(K0,K1, U ;VE |J = 0) −→ 0 as n −→ ∞. All terms
and assertions below are conditioned on the event J = 0,
but this is being suppressed for ease of writing.
I(K0,K1, U ;VE)
= I(KU ,KU , U ;VE)
= I(U ;VE) + I(KU ;VE |U) + I(KU ;VE |U,KU)
= I(U ;VE) + I(KU ;U, VE) + I(KU ;U,KU , VE)
We will look at each of the above three terms separately.
I(U ;VE)
= I(U ;Zn,F)
= I(U ;Zn, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1)
≤ I(U ;Zn, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0, S0,K1, S1)
= I(U ;Zn, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,S0, S1)
[ since K0,K1 are independent of all the variables above]
= I(U ;SL ⊕Q,S0, S1|Z
n, G˜, B˜)
= H(SL ⊕Q,S0, S1|Z
n, G˜, B˜))
−H(SL ⊕Q,S0, S1|U,Z
n, G˜, B˜)
≤ |SL|+ |S0|+ |S1| −H(SL, S0, S1|U,Q,Z
n, G˜, B˜)
= |SL|+ |SU |+ |SU | −H(SL, SC , SC |U,G,B, Z
n, G˜, B˜)
[since (G,B) is a function of (U,Q, G˜, B˜) and Q is
a function of (U,G,B)]
= |SL|+ |SU |+ |SU |
−H(SL, SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S , Z
n|G˜L)
[since SL, SU , SU − Zn|G, Zn|G˜S , Zn|G˜L−
U,G,B, Zn, G˜, B˜ is a Markov chain ]
= |SL|+ |SU |+ |SU | −H(SL | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S , Z
n|G˜L)
−H(SU , SU | SL, Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S , Z
n|G˜L)
= (|SL| −H(SL | Zn|G˜L))
+ (|SU |+ |SU | −H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S ))
[since SL − Zn|G˜L − Zn|G, Zn|G˜S and
SU , SU − Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S − SL, Z
n|G˜L are Markov Chains]
The first term above is small since SL is a secret key
against Eve. Lemma 2 of Appendix B implies that the
second term is also small.
I(KU ;U, VE)
= I(KU ;U,Z
n,F)
= I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1)
= I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU ⊕ SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
≤ I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU , SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,SC ,KU ⊕ SU )
[since KU is independent of all other variables above]
≤ I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL, Q, SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U,Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL, G,B, SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
[since (G,B) is a function of (U,Q, G˜, B˜) and Q is
a function of (U,G,B)]
= I(KU ;SU , SL, Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜,KU ⊕ SU )
[since KU − SU , SL, Zn|G, Zn|G˜,KU ⊕ SU -
U,Zn, G,B, G˜, B˜ is a Markov chain]
= I(KU ;SU , SL, Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜L , Z
n|G˜S ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;SU , Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S ,KU ⊕ SU )
[ since KU −KU ⊕ SU , SU , Zn|G, Zn|G˜S − SL, Zn|G˜L
is a Markov chain ]
= I(KU ;SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
= H(SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
−H(SU , SU | KU , Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
= H(SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
−H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
≤ |SU |+ |SU | −H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
The above term is small as a consequence of Lemma 2
in Appendix B.
I(KU ;C,KU , VE)
= I(KU ;U,KU , Z
n,F)
= I(KU ;U,KC , Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,K0 ⊕ S0,K1 ⊕ S1)
= I(KU ;U,KU , Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU ⊕ SU ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U,KU , SU , Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U, SU , Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL ⊕Q,KU ⊕ SU )
[since KU is independent of all other varables above]
≤ I(KU ;U, SU , Z
n, G˜, B˜, SL, Q,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;U, SU , SL, Z
n, G˜, B˜, G,B,KU ⊕ SU )
[since (G,B) is a function of (U,Q, G˜, B˜) and Q is
a function of (U,G,B)]
= I(KU ;SU , SL, Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜,KU ⊕ SU )
[since KU − SU , SL, Zn|G, Zn|G˜,KU ⊕ SU−
U,Zn, G,B, G˜, B˜ is a Markov chain]
= I(KU ;SU , SL, Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜L , Z
n|G˜S ,KU ⊕ SU )
= I(KU ;SU , Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S ,KU ⊕ SU )
[ since KU −KU ⊕ SU , SU , Zn|G, Zn|G˜S − SL, Z
n|G˜L
is a Markov chain]
= I(KU ;SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
= H(SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
−H(SU , SU | KU , Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
= H(SU ,KU ⊕ SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
−H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
≤ |SU |+ |SU | −H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S )
The above term is small, again as a consequence of
Lemma 2.
APPENDIX B
A USEFUL LEMMA
Lemma 2. Let Alice transmit a sequence Xn of i.i.d. Ber( 12 )
bits and let Bob define the sets G,B, G˜S as in Protocol 1.
There exists a sequence of codes {MUn ,MUn }n∈N, where
MUn : (X
n|G˜S , X
n|G) 7→ SU and MUn : (Xn|G˜S , X
n|B) 7→
SU such that |SU | = |SU | = nr and, for n −→∞,
1) H(SU , SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S)− 2nr −→ 0,
2) H(SU | Xn|G˜S )− nr −→ 0.
Proof: We prove this lemma using a random coding
argument. The codes (maps) MUn and MUn are chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random from among all possible
maps. We treat the entropies H(SU , SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S ) and
H(SU | X
n|G˜S) as random variables (which depend on
the random code). It then suffices to show that with high
probability they approach 2nr and nr, respectively.
We will make use of Lemma 3, which is stated after this
proof. Consider,
H(SU , SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
= H(SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S ) +H(SU | SU , Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S)
≥ H(SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S) +H(SU | X
n|G, X
n|G˜S ).
For the second term, we may directly invoke Lemma 3 using
the fact that |B| > |SU | = nr to conclude that with high
probability the second term approaches nr. For the first term,
let Υ be the typical event that the fraction of erasures in
(Zn|G, Z
n|G˜S ) is at least a ǫ2(1−
δ
2 ).
H(SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S ) ≥ H(SU | Z
n|G, Z
n|G˜S ,Υ)P (Υ).
Using the fact that P (Υ) → 1 and invoking Lemma 3 we
may conclude that the first term also approaches nr with high
probability.
We may directly invoke Lemma 3 as we did above for
the second term to conclude that H(SU |Xn|G˜S) → nr with
high probability. Hence, by union bound we can conclude
that with high probability H(SU , SU | Zn|G, Zn|G˜S ) and
H(SU | X
n|G˜S ) approach 2nr and nr, respectively.
Lemma 3. Let α, β, δ > 0 be such that α + β + δ < 1. Let
X be a vector chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}n. Let
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}nα be a map chosen uniformly at random
from all possible maps. Then with high probability over the
choice of f , the map satisfies the property that for every I ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , n} with |I| ≤ nβ, and for every y ∈ {0, 1}|I|,
H(f(X)|X |I = y) ≥ nα− 2
−δn
.
Proof: Let us first fix a particular subset I and a re-
alization X |I = y. Without loss of generality, we assume
|I| = nβ. Let us denote J := IC for simplicity. Now,
f : X |J 7→ {0, 1}
nα is only a function of the components of X
in J . Let Y1, Y2, · · · , YN denote the images f(X |J , X |I = y)
of all X |J ∈ {0, 1}|J|, where N = 2|J| = 2n(1−β). Clearly
these are independent and uniformly distributed over the
2nα binary strings in {0, 1}nα. The empirical distribution of
Yi; i = 1, 2, · · · , N is denoted as pˆJ . Rest of the proof is
exactly the same as that of [11, Lemma 10]. We repeat it here
for completeness.
By Sanov’s theorem,
Pr
[
H(pˆJ) < nα− 2
−nδ
]
≤ (N + 1)2
nα
2−ND(p
∗||u)
where u dentoes the uniform distribution over {0, 1}nα, and
p∗ = arg min
p:H(p)<nα−2−nδ
D(p||u).
Clearly,
D(p∗||u) = nα−H(p∗) > 2−nδ.
So
Pr
[
H(pˆJ) < nα− 2
−nδ
]
< (2|J| + 1)2
nα
2−2
|J|·2−nδ
< 2n(1−β+1/n)·2
nα
· 2−2
n(1−β)·2−nδ
≤ 2−2
nα(2n(1−β−α−δ)−n(1−β+1/n)).
Since β + α+ δ < 1, by union bound, we have
Pr
[
H(pˆJ ) < nα− 2
−nδ for some I and some y ∈ {0, 1}|I|
]
≤ 2−2
nα
This goes to zero doubly exponentially fast as n→∞.
